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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 15556 
-vs-
JACK Wl'.RREN NOMELAND 
and DONALD FARRELL, 
Defendants-Appellants.: 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1977 Supp.). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On November 9, 1977, the matter was tried in the 
Fourth Judicial District before the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, District Judge, sitting with a jury. Both defen-
dants were convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment and 
sentence of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent concurs with the statement of facts as 
presented in Appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION BY GIVING 
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER THIRTEEN. 
At the end of the trial in question, Judge Bullock 
cautioned the jury with the following instruction: 
"A defendant in a criminal case is 
not required to testify in his own behalf. 
The law expressly gives him the privilege 
of not testifying if he so desires. The 
fact that defendant Jack Warren Nomeland 
has not taken the witness stand must not 
be taken as any indication of his guilt, 
nor should you indulge in any presumption 
or inference adverse to him by reason 
thereof. The burden remains with the state, 
regardless of whether the defendant testifies 





I evidence his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt." (R.26) 
An almost identical instruction was the focal point I 
I 
of a recent United States Supreme Court case. In Lakesid~\ 
Oregon, 46 L.W. 4248 (March 22, 1978) the trial judge gave 
an instruction which read: 
"Under the laws of this State a 
defendant has the option to take the 
witness stand to testify in his or her 
-2-
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own behalf. If a defendant chooses 
not to testify, such a circumstance 
gives rise to no inference or presump-
tion against the defendant, and this 
must not be considered by you in 
determining the question of guilt or 
innocence." Id. at 4249 
The petitioner in Lakeside presented the same 
argument that appellant presents in the present case. He 
contended that "this protective instruction becomes con-
stitutionally impermissible when given over defendant's 
objection." Id. at 4249. 
In concluding that this argument was without merit 
the Court observed, 
"The petitioner's argument would 
require indulgence in two very doubtful 
assumptions: First, that the jurors have 
not noticed that the defendant did not 
testify and will not, therefore, draw 
adverse inferences on their own. Second, 
that the jurors will totally disregard 
the instruction, and affirmatively give 
weight to what they have been told not 
to consider at all. Federal constitutional 
law cannot rest on speculative assumptions 
so dubious as these." Id. at 4250. 
The Court specifically distinguished the facts of 
Lakeside from the case established in Griffin v. California, 
380 U.S. 690, 85 s.ct. 1229 (1965), a case cited in appellant's 
brief. In Griffin the instruction given by the trial court 
stated that the jury could take defendant's failure to testify 
into consideration during its deliberation. Id. at 610. ~he 
Supreme Court found that this comment did violate defendant's 
constitutional rights. Id. at 614. 
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The Court in Lakeside found an important difference 
between the cautionary comment set out in Lakeside and the 
adverse comment given in Griffin: 
"The Court concluded in Griffin 
that unconstitutional compulsion was 
inherent in a trial where prosecutor 
and judge were free to ask the jury to 
draw adverse inferences from a defendant's 
failure to take the witness stand. But 
a judge's instruction that the jury must 
draw no adverse inferences of any kind from 
the defendant's exercise of his privilege 
not to testify is 'comment' of an entirely 
different order. Such an instruction can-
not provide the pressure on a defendant 
found impremissible in Griff in. On the 
contrary, its very purpose is to remove 
from the jury's deliberations any influence 
of unspoken adverse inferences. 46 L.W. 
at 4250. 
Such a cautionary instruction serves to clarify~! 
fact that a defendant has a constitutionally protected option [ 
to testify or not, as he deems appropriate. This clarificatio:I 
1. 
does not waive a red flag of negative inference in front of I 
the jury. ( 
This conclusion was also established in a New Mexico 
case. In New Mexico v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 519, 505 P.2d 862 (Bi: 
two co-defendants were convicted of rape. The judge gave an I 
instruction similiar to the one in question since only OM~ 
I 
the co-defendant's had testified during the trial. The supre:;I 
Court said that defendant's argument that this instruction was 
prejudicial was meritless. "In effect, Garcia attempts to 
avoid an instruction which protects a constitutional right." 
-4- l 
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Id. at 863. See also Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 171 
(10th Cir. 1968). 
This Court should affirm the trial court's actions 
in the giving of the cautionary instruction in question. 
This result is mandated by law and logic. As commented in 
Lakeside, supra, "(i]t would be strange indeed to conclude 
that this cautionary instruction violates the very constitu-
tional provision it is intended to protect." 
CONCLUSION 
The instruction given by trial court which cautioned 
the jury against making any negative presumptions or inferences 
because one of the defendants did not testify was properly 
given for the purpose of protecting appellant's important right 
against compulsory self-incrimination. Such action violated 
no rights or appellant and should be affirmed. 
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